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Abstract  
This essay deconstructs the order/disorder 
binary. Drawing on the work of Henri Bergson, 
it replaces the idea of disorder with the con-
cept of two positive orders. The essay con-
cludes with a philosophical example of how we 
might reconceive the biomedical opposition of 
normality/pathology without relying on the 
idea of disorder. 
 
Résumé 
Cet essai déconstruit le concept binaire de 
normal/trouble. En se basant sur le travail 
d’Henri Bergson, il remplace l’idée du trouble 
avec le concept de deux « normativités » 
positives. L’essai conclut en offrant un exemple 
philosophique sur comment re-concevoir 
l’opposition biomédicale de normalité/ path-
ologie, sans avoir recours à l’idée du trouble. 
 
In the tradition of Western metaphysics, 
the concepts of “order” and “disorder” invoke—
indeed, are constituted by and constitutive of—
sequential and dichotomous logics.1 Within 
these logics order functions as the privileged 
term, the norm, that which is primordial and 
prior to the differences that go by the name of 
disorders. Disorders figure not only as second-
ary, temporary, or erroneous re-iterations of 
prior orders (biological, psychological, 
epistemological, or social). Disorders also 
figure—as the prefix of “dis” suggests—as 
negations of these orders. Disorder acts, in 
other words, against the “natural” or 
normative order(s) of life. Where order is 
naturalized, idealized, and perpetually pursued, 
disorder is lamented, depreciated, or 
pathologized as something to be corrected, 
cured, or transcended, if not in the present 
tense then in an imaginary future order. But 
what is this notion of disorder that functions 
as order’s negation? Of what does it consist? 
And what is its relationship to order?  
Questions about the epistemological 
status of the pairing of order and disorder are 
anything but abstract and immaterial. Notions of 
order and disorder are much more than 
ideational. Ideas and concepts are, as quantum 
theorist Karen Barad (2007) notes (following 
Niels Bohr), part of “material-discursive 
apparatuses” which are themselves “formative 
of matter and meaning” (146). In other words, 
ideas of order and disorder are intrinsic to the 
material structures and practices that produce 
what come to be known as individuals and 
populations, just as these ideas assemble, 
organize, govern, and give meaning and 
affective depth to human lives. This is 
nowhere more apparent than in the material-
discursive apparatus that is the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM). Far from a directory of inconsequential 
and abstract technical jargon, the DSM 4th 
edition comprises concepts of mental disorder 
that profoundly shape the embodied realities 
of human life, happiness, suffering, and even 
death. Alterations to meanings of disorders 
correspondingly produce alterations to the sub-
stance and liveability of human life. 
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This essay is an attempt not to map 
the effects of categories of disorder on 
individual lives, but to contribute to one such 
epistemological alteration to the very notion 
of disorder itself; an alteration that might clear 
the ground for profound transformations of 
human life. It is divided into three parts, two 
of which correspond roughly to two moves of 
deconstruction—reversal and displacement—
and the final section, which considers, via the 
work of Georges Canguilhem, an example of 
how we might reconceive the biomedical 
opposition of normality/pathology without relying 
on the idea of disorder. 
 
Order and Its Other(s) 
It seems obvious, perhaps even 
necessary, to begin a discussion of disorder 
by first considering the notion of order.  
The concept of order is fundamental 
to Western thought and to thought itself. It is 
central to perception, to action, to organization, 
to categorization, to language, to causality, to 
the event, to the phenomenon, and to 
communication. As physicists David Bohm 
and David Peat (2000) note, the “notion of 
order extends beyond the confines of a 
particular theory; permeates the whole infra-
structure of concepts, ideas, and values; and 
enters the very framework in which human 
thought is understood and action carried out” 
(104‒5). Two of the hegemonic traditions of 
Western thought, namely metaphysics and 
rationalist science, are both made possible 
by, and are centrally concerned with, order: 
orders of nature and orders of logic, orders of 
experience and orders of meaning, practical 
orders and ideal orders, unknown orders and 
known orders, existent orders and orders 
longed for. Thought, knowledge, human 
practice, and life are reflective of both the 
drive to order and the drive to apprehend 
order. Thought, knowledge, practice, and life 
are reflective of order itself. 
However, despite, or as philosopher 
Ruth Lorand suggests, perhaps because of, its 
centrality to thought, knowledge, experience, 
and action, order is a concept that has re-
ceived relatively scant philosophical con-
sideration. Lorand (2000) notes that while dis-
cussions of “existence, status, kinds and 
measure of order in a given system” are 
commonplace, “the idea of order itself is 
either briefly sketched, implied, or it is ignored 
altogether” (8). This is more than a little un-
settling, especially given the prevalence of 
the term disorder as a descriptor and 
definition for innumerable behaviours, identities, 
conditions, and states of being. So what 
exactly is order? To be sure, it has multiple 
meanings. At its simplest, we might think of 
order, following the OED, as “sequence or 
succession in space or time,” as “the course 
or method of occurrence or action,” or as an 
“arrangement found in the existing con-
stitution of things” (1459‒1460). Implicit here 
are notions of complexity and heterogeneity 
(i.e., an entity or system having distinct parts). 
Pure homogeneity is not ordered according to 
standard logic, it would seem, because there 
is no differentiation, no arrangement, and no 
sequence. There is, rather, only uniformity. 
Usually, some notion of lawfulness or necessity 
is implicit or added to the definition of order, 
such that the parts of an entity or system are 
governed or patterned by some ordering 
principle. Rudolph Arnheim, for example, 
defines order as “the degree and kind of 
lawfulness governing the relations among the 
parts of an entity” (in Lorand 2000, 9). 
Similarly, order is usually assumed to be a con-
dition of logical or comprehensible arrange-
ment among the separate elements of a 
group. 
What unites (or perhaps “orders”) any 
concept of order, however, is the idea that it 
can be defined in a single concept. This 
assumption of only one type of order is endemic 
to rationalistic science and metaphysics, and 
it operates as a default or foundational con-
cept of these paradigms. That is, at its simplest, 
only one kind of order exists, and this is 
opposed binarily to disorder. Of course, within 
the metaphysical schema, it is certainly 
granted that there are multiple sub-orders or 
types of order. However, all sub-orders and 
types of order are conceptually derivative of, 
or secondary to, some prior notion of order as 
a singular concept. Order resides, it appears, 
at the origin of all sequence, and sequence is 
the essence of order. The definition of order 
is thus circular, tautologous, and self-referential: 
order is part of its own definition.  
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The distinction between order and 
disorder usually operates as a classical binary 
opposition. The binary functions as a hierarchy: 
order precedes disorder; order is privileged 
over disorder; order sets the terms of 
disorder’s meaning; and order requires a 
contrast with its subordinate to establish its 
superiority. In this way the order/disorder binary 
is exemplary of the Derridean “metaphysics 
of presence.” Order becomes what Jacques 
Derrida (1976) would call the “transcendental 
signified” (49). Its presence is implied by, and 
figured as, the foundation of, all meaning. 
Disorder, in contrast, is the absence of order 
(and thus meaning); it is order’s negation. Of 
course, within metaphysics, even though 
disorder is constituted as the negation of 
order, like order itself, disorder is assumed to 
be a reality—even if only an intuited one. 
Disorder exists, so it is assumed, despite the 
fact that the dualistic logic of its framing 
constructs it as an absence of order. It is the 
reality of the other to order, even if that is not 
possible to conceptualize. Epistemologically, 
therefore, disorder is almost always the 
projection of absence onto the Other (by 
other I mean other entities, other conditions, 
other states of affairs, other people). That 
certain others or states of affairs come to 
occupy, or stand in for, the category of disorder 
does little to undermine this epistemic 
function. An individual may certainly be 
diagnosed as having a mental disorder such 
as psychosis, or a state of affairs may be 
deemed chaotic, and this gives us the 
impression that so-called disorders have a 
presence and a positivity. It gives us the 
impression that disordered entities and states 
are something. And in one sense they are: 
psychosis, for instance, is the grouping to-
gether of particular symptoms. But this is a 
sociological or practical exercise of selective 
combination. At root, epistemologically, the 
definition of disorder that is imputed onto or 
that underwrites this collection of symptoms—
dare I say, that organizes them; although I 
don’t want to jump my deconstructive gun—
entails an abiding absence and negativity. 
This is the absence and negation of order. 
Needless to say, while the term disorder may 
involve certain epistemological functions, it 
also produces very real effects for individuals, 
groups, and societies that take disorder as an 
organizing principle. The categorization and 
treatment of individuals defined by the DSM IV 
is one of the more obvious examples of this. 
Throughout the last several decades, 
a number of social movements have emerged 
to challenge hegemonic constructions of 
apparently “disordered” subjectivities, be-
haviours, conditions, and bodies. Among these 
prominent movements are, of course, anti-
psychiatry, gay liberation (and queer), and 
disability movements of the 1960s, 70s, and 
80s. (Feminism is another obvious move-
ment.) As we know, anti-psychiatry led the 
way by launching an attack on the normative 
terrain of mental health. R.D. Laing, Thomas 
Szasz, Michel Foucault, and others fiercely 
contested notions of mental disorder and 
illness, normality, and pathology. (Unfortunately, 
this does not seem to have inhibited the 
seemingly ever-expanding list of mental dis-
orders in the DSM IV.) Drawing on anti-
psychiatry, gay liberation applied this critique to 
dominant notions of homosexuality as a mental 
disorder and pathology. And disability activists 
and scholars have rigorously challenged pre-
vailing notions of disability as an individualized 
and “alien condition” (Snyder et al. 2002, 2). 
Although there have certainly been spaces of 
overlap and mutual influence among these 
movements, each has developed a relatively 
distinct set of discourses, institutions, interests, 
practices, and activities. Yet one of the things 
that unites each of them is a critical orientation 
to notions of normative orders and ideas of 
disorder.  
To some extent, each of the anti-
psychiatry, gay/queer, and disability movements 
has, in certain incarnations and at certain 
moments, represented efforts to reverse or 
overturn the hierarchy of order and disorder, as 
this hierarchy has been mapped onto the 
oppositions of normality/pathology, hetero-
sexual/homosexual, and able-bodied/disabled 
body. Or, at the very least, these movements 
have sought to valorize, privilege, and normalize 
the realities and lives of those individuals who 
have been forcibly labelled as disordered—
and this is still something of a strategy of 
reversal or overturning. It is a deconstructive 
move which, to use Derrida’s words, “brings 
low what was high” (Derrida 1981, 42). Such a 
move of reversal is evident in Michel Foucault’s 
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call, in Madness and Civilization, to listen to 
the voices of madness, or, unreason (Foucault 
1965). It was evident in gay liberationists’ 
exaltation of homosexuality both through 
exhortations of “gay pride” and through claims 
that it offers a privileged vantage point on 
gender and sexuality, heteronormativity, and 
oppression.2 Disability activists and scholars 
have likewise engaged in a politics of reversal, 
or, overturning. This is apparent in the re-
figuration of able-bodiedness as “a temporary 
identity at best” (Siebers 2008, 5) and “the 
universal consequence of living an embodied 
life” (Snyder et al. 2002, 2).3 Overturning 
binary and hierarchical orderings is an 
inevitable aspect, however temporary, of any 
attempt at contesting the devaluation and 
subordination of the other-than-normative. 
One of the ways each of these move-
ments has momentarily reversed hierarchical 
binary orderings is by appropriating the tropes 
from which they have traditionally been ex-
cluded, such as centrality over marginality, 
visibility and presence over invisibility and 
absence. The formerly dominant term, in this 
overturning phase, is itself problematized and 
devalued. Let me briefly give just a few 
examples from the three movements already 
mentioned. Thomas Szasz (1961) famously 
rejected the categories of mental illness and 
disorder, arguing they are merely normative 
judgements that substitute for problems in 
living. Disability scholars, such as Tobin 
Siebers (2008), have argued that disability 
“defines the invisible centre around which our 
contradictory ideology about human ability 
revolves” (8‒9). For many queer theorists, the 
aim is not just to challenge normative 
representations, but to expose the queerness 
always already residing within the normative. 
Queer theory’s strategies of anti-identification 
and resistance to “regimes of the normal” 
(Warner 1991, 16) are precisely attempts at 
reversing (hetero)normative order. In fact, 
queer, for some, such as Lee Edelman, is the 
very movement of disorder, the act of 
embracing negativity (Edelman 2004, 4). I’m 
not suggesting, of course, that reversal is the 
only strategy used, just that it is an important 
one at particular moments and in particular 
contexts.  
So what of the dichotomy of order/ 
disorder itself? What might a specific reversal 
of this look like? In some ways we don’t have 
to look too far for examples of this. Many of 
the great theistic creation stories do this for 
us. Often in these stories, order is said to be 
created out of a chaos and disorder. Order is 
an act of divine intervention over a disorder 
conceived, in certain ways, as prior and 
primordial. Even though some god is posited 
as the sign of ultimate order, the creation of 
life emerges out of and after primordial chaos 
and disorder. And even though creation might 
be thought to spring from a void, emptiness, 
absence, or darkness, as in some creation 
renditions, disorder is figured as meta-
physically prior, before order. This disorder is 
at base akin to a total lack of differentiation; it is 
homogeneity. Order, in contrast, is only possible 
with some degree of differentiation and 
complexity, such that there must be elements in 
some relationship or arrangement. These are, of 
course, creation stories, which rely notoriously 
on origin myths. Yet, perhaps, they are not 
much different from the tradition of Western 
metaphysics, which, as I mentioned earlier, 
holds by default onto a logic of singular order. 
That is, when logically broken down there is, 
epistemologically, a single type of order against 
which disorder is contrasted.4 However, in 
being that against which order posits itself, 
disorder, in one sense, is being instated as 
prior to order, as the origin. For order does 
not exist prior to its positing; that is, prior to its 
having been ordered by what posits order. 
Metaphysics thus partakes of another creation 
story. It relies on a projection of a prior 
disorder, and then disavows this prioritization 
in order to prioritize order.  
 
Ordering Disorder 
A second interlinked deconstructive 
strategy is, as we know, the displacement of 
the binary opposition (Derrida 1988, 21). One 
way of thinking about this is through the idea 
of exploiting the instability of the binary of 
order/disorder. Another aspect of the dis-
placement strategy concerns the subversion of 
claims of priority of either of the terms. It is 
the performance of an analysis that exposes 
the mutual interdependence of the two terms, 
as well as their contingency. The aim is to 
expose the ways in which each term always 
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already inhabits and interpenetrates the other, 
such that each requires its other for its own 
definition. Not much more needs to be said 
about this; this move has certainly become 
stock and trade of poststructuralist-inflected 
analyses. It does almost seem passé.” 
But I have wanted to retain an 
emphasis on these deconstructive strategies 
for a number of reasons. The first is that the 
order/disorder binary has in some ways 
gotten off lightly in terms of explicit de-
constructions. Secondly, as Derrida (1981) 
reminds us, the overturning phase is “structural” 
and “interminable.” It must be engaged over 
and over again. “Unlike those authors whose 
death does not await their demise,” says 
Derrida, “the time for overturning is never a 
dead letter” (41‒2). Thirdly, I would like to 
gesture towards—dare I say—the “beyond” of 
deconstruction. Now, given what I’ve just said 
about the interminable necessity of de-
construction, I don’t mean by this that 
deconstruction is “dead” or passé, as some 
like to claim, and that we need to leave it 
behind. The double gesture of deconstruction 
is something we cannot do without. It is also 
something that those of us working to 
challenge binary hierarchies usually already 
do at various moments in our work. And it will 
continue to be part of our work so long as 
there are hierarchical oppositions. That said, 
my third reason for framing part of this essay 
around the well-worn path of deconstructive 
strategies is so I can highlight what de-
construction necessarily does in order to 
show what it doesn’t do and where it doesn’t 
go (or perhaps want to go for that matter). For 
Derrida, deconstruction is a strategy within 
Western metaphysics; although this is not to 
say the idea of différance is not applicable 
beyond this terrain.5 Deconstruction de-
stabilizes oppositions but, as Jack Reynolds 
(2002) points out, “more often than not it does 
not concern itself with positively framing a 
new and original way of thinking about 
oppositions—even if it provides tools that 
may be useful for doing so” (144, emphasis 
added). I want to think about this question of 
framing in order to consider how we might go 
from hierarchical difference to what Morgan 
Holmes (2008) describes as “neutral difference” 
(28). The idea of “beyond” I’m gesturing towards 
(but will say much more about in a moment) 
is the kind of positive framing of the binary of 
order/disorder for which deconstruction pre-
pares but does not carry out. To begin this 
(re)framing, I turn to the work of Henri 
Bergson. 
Bergson has been described as 
“probably the last of the great metaphysicians” 
(Grosz 2004, 155). However, his was a meta-
physics with a difference. Indeed, according 
to Deleuze, “Bergsonism must bring the 
greatest contribution to a philosophy of 
difference” (quoted in Grosz 2000, 155). I 
want to consider two short sections of two 
chapters from his (at the time) enormously 
successful work Creative Evolution that bear 
directly on the question of order and disorder. 
For Bergson, traditional Western thought 
about order is based on two assumptions: 1. 
There is ultimately just one type of order 
(although many subtypes); and 2. Order “is a 
triumph over disorder, [which is] a claim that 
implies the existence of disorder” (Lorand 
1992, 580). This single order, that is at the 
heart of philosophy and science, is what 
Bergson calls geometrical order. It is the 
spatial and intellectual order; the mechanical 
order of atomistic and causal relations 
between seemingly distinct elements; it is a 
“logic of solids” that imposes homogenous 
shape, form, and stasis to entities that are in 
actuality always in interactive motion (Bergson 
1911, xix, 244). Reality is a “perpetual be-
coming” (1911, 296). Bergson substitutes the 
two metaphysical assumptions about order 
with two of his own: 1. There are two types of 
order; and 2. Disorder does not exist (Lorand 
1992, 580). Let me start with the second 
claim—disorder does not exist—as it is tied to 
the problem of negation mentioned above 
(i.e., disorder as the negation of order). 
Demonstrating the second claim is necessary 
to get to the first. For Bergson, the idea of 
disorder is what “Philosophy borrows...from 
daily life.” He goes on: “And it is un-
questionable that, when ordinarily we speak 
of disorder, we are thinking of something. But 
of what?” Bergson asks (1911, 241). He then 
uses a number of examples about defining a 
negative idea such as disorder to illustrate 
the problems of it as a concept: 
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Example 1 
If I choose a volume in my library at random, I may 
put it back on the shelf after glancing at it and say, 
“This is not verse.” Is this what I have really seen 
in turning over the leaves of the book? Obviously 
not. I have not seen, I never shall see, an absence 
of verse. I have seen prose. (1911, 241‒2) 
 
Example 2 
When I enter a room and pronounce it to be “in 
disorder,” what do I mean? (1911, 254) 
 
Example 3 
When I say, “This table is black,” I am speaking of 
the table; I have seen it black, and my judgment 
expresses what I have seen. But if I say, “This 
table is not white,” I surely do not express 
something I have perceived, for I have seen black, 
and not an absence of white. (1911, 312‒13) 
Bergson continues by identifying the 
problem common to each of these examples: 
“The very root of all the difficulties and errors 
with which we are confronted is to be found in 
the power ascribed here to negation. We 
represent negation as exactly symmetrical 
with affirmation...[However] to deny always 
consists in setting aside a possible affirmation” 
(1911, 312). Therefore, “while affirmation 
bears directly on the thing, negation aims at 
the thing only indirectly, through an inter-
posed affirmation” (313). Negation is but “an 
attitude taken by the mind toward an eventual 
affirmation” (312). 
Bergson goes further than this, 
though. He highlights the way that negation, and 
thus disorder (a negative concept), is connected 
to a particular form of social, pedagogical, 
and interpersonal judgment. Let me return to 
the black table example. Bergson says, 
The proposition, “This table is not white,” implies 
that you might believe it white, that you did believe 
it such, or that I was going to believe it such. I 
warn you or myself that this judgment is to be 
replaced by another...When we deny, we give a 
lesson to others, or it may be to ourselves. We 
take to task an interlocutor, real or possible, whom 
we find mistaken and whom we put on his guard. 
He was affirming something: we tell him he ought 
to affirm something else (though without specifying 
the affirmation which must be substituted). There 
is no longer then, simply, a person and an object; 
there is, in face of the object, a person speaking to 
a person, opposing him and aiding him at the 
same time; there is a beginning of society. 
Negation aims at someone, and not only, like a 
purely intellectual operation, at something. It is of a 
pedagogical and social nature. It sets straight or 
rather warns...(1911, 313-14; emphasis added) 
In short, in judging the table as not 
white, it is “not on the table itself that I bring 
this judgment to bear, but rather on the judg-
ment that would declare the table white. I 
judge a judgment and not the table” (313). If 
negation is second-degree affirmation—but 
an undisclosed affirmation of some thing—
then this suggests that negation is a rather 
insidious, even if unwitting, form of ordering. 
It is the instantiation of an undisclosed norm-
ative order. Bergson is even more cynical 
about this. He argues that the idea of disorder 
emerges from a mind that is disappointed and 
disinterested in what it finds. Let us return to 
the “disordered” bed-room example. What is 
found when the person enters the messy 
bedroom and describes it as disordered is not 
the absence of order, but the absence of an 
order one expected and/or wanted to find. 
The supposed “disorder” that is found is 
actually nothing but a function of the norm-
ative order so desired (254). What this reflects, 
says Bergson, is “only the disappoint-ment of 
the mind confronted with an order that does 
not interest it” (257). That is, this represents 
the “disappointment of a mind that finds 
before it an order different from what it wants, 
an order with which it is not concerned at the 
moment, and which, in this sense, does not 
exist for it” (243). Thus, for Bergson, “all that 
is left of disorder is a word” (299). Like the 
notions of “the void and of the nought,” 
Bergson pronounces disorder to be a “pseudo-
idea” (302). It is a term without a referent.  
The resonances of this Bergsonian 
line of thought with a critical disability studies 
emphasis on the social model of disability and 
discrimination are, for me, palpable. Recall how, 
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within the social model of disability, disability 
is seen, as Tobin Siebers (2008) notes, as 
the “product of a disabling social and built 
environment” (3)—or, we could say, the pro-
duct of a disabling order. Bergson’s meta-
physics also highlights the rather distasteful 
subjective and interpersonal dimension to 
discrimination known only too well to people 
with disabilities. Of course, commonplace 
definitions of discrimination—as, say, “any 
practice that makes distinctions between 
individuals or groups that dis-advantage 
some and advantage others”—euphemize or 
disavow this connection. For Bergson, if I 
dare to speak for him for a moment, 
discrimination of people with “dis-abilities” 
and “disorders” could never simply be 
unintentional, unwitting, and non-judgmental. 
Rather, disability and discrimination, as social 
products, involve at some level a metaphysical 
and subjective disinterest and disappointment. 
The phenomenon of interest is, according to 
psychologist Silvan Tomkins (2008)—as it is, I 
suggest, for Bergson—an embodied affect. 
We are, thus, not talking about something 
purely ideational (whatever that may mean). 
What this suggests is that the active seeking 
out of a desired normative order entails a 
subjective and embodied complicity in the 
negative judgment of “disabilities” and “dis-
orders” that the normative social order does 
not want to see or to have exist. A judgment 
of negation, such as disorder (and disability), is 
an affective rejection of an alternative reality, 
an alternative order. 
What I find less depressing about this 
foray into Bergson and his repudiation of the 
idea of disorder is that, far from being re-
dundant, the concept of disorder clearly has a 
practical and deconstructive utility. Any time 
the term disorder is invoked, one is alerted to 
a blatant attempt at the violent substitution of 
an actual reality (or, order so witnessed) with 
a wished for normative order. The idea of 
disorder thus usefully casts a spotlight upon, 
by objectifying in the order of language, the 
affective interests, disappointments, and 
judgments of the Other (other as individual, 
social, and metaphysical).  
But Bergson’s analysis doesn’t stop 
at this point of deconstructive displacement. 
He affirms something in place of this 
metaphysical system. First, he redefines 
order. “That order exists is a fact,“ he argues 
(Bergson 1911, 253). However, he goes on to 
note that “reality is ordered exactly to the 
degree in which it satisfies our thought. Order 
is therefore a certain agreement between 
subject and object. It is the mind finding itself 
again in things” (244). Therefore, as Lorand 
glosses Bergson, because “order reflects the 
operation of the mind, there is no situation in 
which we cannot find some kind of order...No 
particular order is necessary in itself, since for 
any kind of order an alternative one may be 
found” (Lorand 2000, 90). Bergson is not, 
however, suggesting this is all there is to 
order. This ordering function of the mind is 
what he calls the geometrical, or intellectual, 
order. But another order exists in nature, and 
it is here that we arrive at Bergson’s theory of 
“two kinds of order” (Bergson 1911, 253‒258). 
The second order, which is really the 
primordial order, is the vital order of nature. It 
is intuitive rather than intellectual; it is the 
order of becoming, spontaneity, “continuous 
creation,” duration, and movement (244). It 
cannot be reducible to parts or homogeneous 
units. It can only be grasped intuitively; once 
we subject it to the intellect we are in the 
realm of geometrical order. Hence, the 
negation of one order is really the affirmation 
of the other. That is, the absence of one order 
is merely the presence of the other; it is not 
an absence of order. What this means for 
Bergson is that, although disorder functions 
like a knowledge—it produces material 
power/knowledge effects—it is but an empty 
idea that needs to be replaced by the notion 
of two orders. 
 
Orderings and Re-orderings 
According to Lorand (2000), not only 
does Bergson evince a “dualistic tendency...in 
almost every subject he explores” (82), but he 
also favours one element in his trademark 
dualistic pairs: for example, intuition over 
intellect, time (or duration) over space, vital 
over geometric order, and, of course, order 
over disorder. In this sense, it would appear 
that, for Lorand, Bergson’s interventions 
resemble the deconstructive strategy of 
reversal. However, I’d argue that Bergson’s 
dualism, especially with regard to his theory 
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of two orders, is perhaps dualistic in the more 
generic sense of “something comprising two 
aspects” than it is dualistic in the oppositional 
sense.  
According to certain renditions of 
quantum “philosophy-physics,”6 not only is 
there nothing wrong or misdirected about the 
use of the number two, there is, in fact, 
something quite special about the number 
two. Bergson’s philosophy is seen by some 
physicists to have presaged the development 
of early concepts of quantum mechanics 
(Gunter 1969). But it also reflects arguments 
of contemporary quantum theorists. Bohm 
and Peat are two such physicists. Like 
Bergson, Bohm and Peat reject the concept 
of disorder. They argue that everything in life 
happens in some order. Even chance, 
randomness, and what mistakenly goes by 
the name of “disorder” is but a particular form 
of order (Bohm and Peat 2000, 127‒133). 
Order is “context-dependent” and dependent 
upon the scale of measurement (125). What 
appears as randomness in one particular 
order according to one particular scale may 
be another kind of order from a broader scale 
or contextual frame. For Bohm and Peat, 
order itself “is neither subjective nor objective” 
precisely because, when any new context 
appears, “a different notion of order will 
appear” (2000, 125). “[W]hatever we say that 
order is,” they argue, “it isn’t”:  
It is more than we say, as well as being capable of 
being unfolded in infinitely many ways that are 
different. To attempt to attribute order solely to the 
object or to the subject is too limited. It is both and 
neither, and yet something beyond all this: a 
dynamic process that involves subject, object, and 
the cycle of perception-communication that unites 
and relates them This approach suggests that no 
constitutive order is an absolute truth. (120) 
[T]he notion of an ultimate limit to the meaning of 
order that holds in all possible contexts is not 
admitted. (Bohm and Peat 2000, 135) 
What might it mean to begin not from 
the conceptual ground of the order/disorder 
binary, but from a notion of two orders and of 
infinite order? Can we do away with the 
“pseudo-idea” of disorder? How might a notion 
of two orders reorient forms of knowledge, 
politics, and social relations? And how might 
it do this without erasing the often important 
distinctions between and among individuals 
and groups so-labelled as able-bodied versus 
disabled, “together” versus disordered, sick 
versus healthy? 
I don’t pretend to be able to answer 
these questions, or presume there are not 
multiple possible and productive responses. 
However, I do want to gesture towards one 
possible response, by considering how notions 
of normality and pathology, health and sick-
ness, might be rethought if we expunge from 
their conceptual heart the concept of dis-
order. In formulating this response, I have 
found the work of French physician and 
philosopher of biology and medicine Georges 
Canguilhem to be particularly useful. 
Canguilhem is most well-known for his 
doctoral dissertation defended in 1943 and 
translated into English in 1978 as The Normal 
and the Pathological. What interests me 
about Canguilhem’s thought is both his 
rethinking of the distinction between normality 
and pathology, and his conceptualization of 
normativity. Deftly refiguring these concepts 
in ways that avoid both idealism and 
reductionism, Canguilhem seems to avoid the 
collapse of distinctions between normality 
and pathology, illness and health, without 
resort to a judgment of disorder and whilst 
simultaneously retaining the specificity of 
individual difference.  
Interestingly, Canguilhem himself 
drew on Bergson’s notion of disorder as a 
“pseudo-idea.” In so doing, he posited a 
parallel claim to Bergson’s axiom that there is 
no such thing as disorder, but in the biology 
of normality and pathology. Canguilhem 
(2000) declared that “there is no such thing 
as abnormal, if by the term we mean merely 
the absence of a previous positive condition 
or state” (351). What is deemed pathological 
is normal, according to Canguilhem. It is 
merely “another norm, but,” he says, “one 
that is, comparatively speaking, pushed aside 
by life” (354). The “normal should not be 
opposed to the pathological,” and neither, for 
Canguilhem, can the normal or the pathological 
be defined in any absolute sense. The reason 
for this is that the normal and the pathological 
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are specific to individual organisms. They can 
only be ascertained at the level of individual 
experience. At the heart of his account was a 
thorough rewriting of the concepts of normality, 
norms, and normativity. All organisms are 
normal, says Canguilhem. “The state of any 
living thing in a given situation is, in general, 
always normal” (351). Of course, in 
conventional medicine, disease or illness is 
considered a deviation from certain biological 
norms. However, for Canguilhem, norms, in 
the biological and medical sense, are not 
universal biological truths. They are instead 
experiential habits and ways of living 
established by the individual organism itself in 
its ongoing relationship with the environment. 
Normality is not equivalent to health. Rather, 
normativity is health (351). What he means 
by this is that normativity, or health, is the 
ability of an individual, or, organism to 
tolerate “infractions of the[ir] norm, of 
overcoming contradictions, of dealing with 
conflicts” (352). Normativity, or, health, is the 
state of being “open to possible future 
correction.” To “be sick is to be unable to 
tolerate change” (354). “A sick individual is an 
individual locked in a struggle with its 
environment to establish a new order or 
stability. Recovery establishes a new norm, 
different from the old one” (355). Here we 
have a biological rendition of the two orders 
thesis. 
Importantly, for Canguilhem, “No 
environment is normal,“ however (354). This 
is a critical point, lest we slide dangerously 
close to re-pathologizing individuals for 
problems created by social orders. Rather, it 
“is the relation between the environment and 
the living thing that determines what is normal 
in both” (354). This leaves open the 
possibility of critiquing how the relationship 
between individual and society is constituted, 
enforced, and managed. Here we can see a 
resonance with the critique proffered by the 
social model of disability, in which disability is 
seen to be a “product of a disabling social 
and built environment” (Siebers 2008, 3). In 
the contemporary intellectual environment of 
(queer) critique of all-things-normative, 
Canguilhem’s refiguring of the concept of 
normativity itself introduces and valorizes 
difference within the very definition of the 
concept. What is also particularly helpful, I 
think, is that Canguilhem’s model of the 
normal and the pathological still allows for 
illness and pathology. Canguilhem is not 
wishing to deny “the distinctiveness of the 
pathological,” for there is, he makes clear, a 
“necessary contrast between health and 
disease” (2000, 351). But it is “suffering, not 
normative measurements and standard 
deviations, that establishes the state of disease” 
(Rabinow, in Canguilhem 1994, 16, emphasis 
added). Rather than defining the health of an 
organism by measuring it against universal 
and static biological norms and standard 
deviations, therefore, Canguilhem insists on 
treating the organism in its environmental 
specificity. Normativity and pathology do have 
a place, however, but they are not 
determined by way of a comparison with ideal 
norms. “A healthy person,” says Canguilhem 
(2000), “is a person capable of confronting 
risks. Health is creative—call it normative—in 
that it is capable of surviving catastrophe [or 
conflict and contradiction] and establishing a 
new order” (355). Within this model, normativity 
and creativity are no more associated with 
the category of the ordered or able-bodied 
than with the so-called “disabled” or 
“disordered” body. 
It is not difficult to see the enormous 
potential for applying the ideas of Bergson 
and Canguilhem within the sphere of bio-
medicine. Disorder and its derivative 
abnormality have no place. Disorder and 
abnormality are only the judgmental and 
disinterested negation of alternative orders, 
alternative norms (in Canguilhem’s sense), 
and alternative lives. Accounting for normality 
and sickness requires an understanding of the 
organism’s shifting relation to itself and its 
environment—not to the norms of others, or 
to ideal human norms. To apprehend this 
requires medical and philosophical analyses 
to begin not from notions of universal 
biological norms (and their correlatives of 
abnormality and disorder), but from the 
perspective of that individual organism’s own 
order, that is, its own positive condition or 
state.  
 
  www.msvu.ca/atlantis ■□    35.2, 2011   19  
Acknowledgments  
Thanks to Morgan Holmes for inviting me to 
present a keynote, from which this essay 
springs, at the “Disorderly Conduct Inter-
disciplinary Conference” (24‒26 July 2009, 
Wilfrid Laurier University and University of 
Waterloo), and for pushing me to speak more 
directly to the subject of disorder. 
 
Endnotes 
1. Bohm and Peat (2000) refer to “order both 
as a means of describing a system—its 
Descriptive Order—and as the actual way a 
system is constituted—its Constitutive Order” 
(272). 
 
 2. Of course, it is also evident in cultural 
feminist valorizations and prioritization of so-
called female attributes; in black pride 
slogans of “black is beautiful,” queer slogans 
of “We’re here [as in present], we’re queer, 
get used to it,” which contrasts starkly with 
gay liberation’s catch-cry of “we are every-
where,” as in lurking often invisibly in society.  
 
3. Siebers (2008) notes that “Many disability  
theorists—and I count myself among them—
would argue that disability as an identity is 
never negative” (4). 
 
4. See Lorand (2000, 82) for a discussion of 
the default assumption, within metaphysics, 
of only one type of order. 
 
5. Vicki Kirby (2005; 2006) argues that 
Derrida’s neologism of différance is 
applicable not only to conventional notions of 
semiotics, but is involved in processes of 
materiality, embodiment, and perception. 
 
6. Here I am following Karen Barad’s 
hyphenated usage of philosophy-physics 
(Barad 2007, 66‒67). Importantly, in view of 
my previous discussion of Bergson, Barad 
characterizes the endeavours of philosophy 
and physics as “interests.” 
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